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A ll social work practice is value based and laden withethical issues and dilemmas. This is strikingly evi-dent in the practice and policy related to adoption.
Ethical issues abound in laws, agency policies, and clinical
practice in adoption (Siegel, 1998). These issues take unique
form in open adoptions, that is, adoptions in which the birth
family and adoptive family have contact with each other.
Identifying these ethical issues in open adoption is a crucial
first step in analyzing alternative ways of addressing them. In
this article we explain what open adoption is, delineate the
types of ethical issues embedded in each phase of the open
adoption experience, and present a framework, derived
from ethical theory and professional ethics standards, for
exploring these issues to shape adoption laws, policies, and
practices that are ethically defensible.
Defining Open Adoption
The term open adoption is used differently throughout the
adoption literature (Gross & Sussman, 1997); these differ-
ent uses reflect different ethical assumptions. For purposes
of the discussion here, open adoption refers to adoptions
in which at least one birth-family member (usually, but not
always, the birth mother) and the adoptive parent(s) have
had some form of contact with each other (e.g., at least one
face-to-face meeting, exchange of letters or e-mail, or tele-
phone conversations); they have shared some identifying
information with one another (perhaps last names or
addresses); and the child, if old enough to have language,
knows that the contact exists. Such openness, and related
ethical issues, can occur in both kinship adoptions, where
children are legally adopted by relatives other than the bio-
logical parents, and nonkinship adoptions.
Different definitions in the adoption literature reflect
different value stances about what constitutes openness,
and these have ethical implications (Siegel, 2003). For
example, some maintain that an adoption is open even if
the criteria listed earlier are not met, but the possibility
of contact exists. Others assert that for an adoption to 
be called open, the adopted child must participate in the
contact. Yet others consider an adoption open if an adop-
tive parent has had contact with a birth-family member,
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though the child has no knowledge of this or is not allowed
to participate in the contact. Still others believe that an
adoption is open even when only first names are used, and
letters are exchanged anonymously through an intermedi-
ary such as an agency or attorney. Grotevant and McRoy
(1997) posited a continuum of openness, ranging from
mediated to semiopen to fully disclosed. Other research
(Siegel, 2003) shows that the range of open adoption alter-
natives is seemingly limitless and does not fit into neatly
defined distinct types; adoptions vary over time in terms of
type of disclosure, contact, frequency, and participants.
It is important to note that open adoption is not shared
parenting; the adoptive parents have full legal rights and
responsibilities as the child’s parents (Melina & Roszia,
1993). Furthermore, open adoption is not the same as
“open records.” An adoption can be open even when the
child’s original birth certificate is sealed in perpetuity by
the courts.1
In the literature there is debate over the goals and pur-
poses of openness in adoption. Some say openness is nec-
essary to protect birth parents’ rights; the inviolable
biological connection between people must be honored,
and birth parents should not be punished for having the
wisdom, courage, and strength to make an adoption plan
(Gritter, 1997). Others say openness is needed to build
stronger adoptive families, that is, the secrets and cutoffs of
traditional, confidential, and closed adoptions impair
communication and build emotional walls within adoptive
homes (Melina, 1993). Most agree that open adoption is
first and foremost for the child’s benefit; it is widely
accepted among adoption professionals today that all chil-
dren need access to information about their genetic, med-
ical, and psychosocial histories, as well as some form of
contact, however minimal, with their biological relatives so
that their questions about their roots and their adoptions
can be answered. It is widely recognized that even when
direct contact between the biological and adoptive families
is not in a particular child’s best interests—for example,
when a biological family member engages in harmfully
inappropriate behavior with the child—some form of
minimal contact, perhaps an anonymous exchange of let-
ters via an agency, is still possible (Melina & Roszia, 1993;
Pavao, 1998). Clearly, a new standard of care has emerged
in adoption; some form of openness, at least the possibil-
ity of contact in the future, is now considered best practice.
Ethics and Openness
In the United States, secrecy, confidentiality, and cutoffs in
adoption did not become the norm until the 1940s when
social workers, seeking to protect birth mothers and their
children from the stigma of out-of-wedlock birth, pushed
for legislation sealing adoption records. Silenced by the
shrouds of shame and social opprobrium, birth parents
and adoptees waited until the civil rights movements of the
1960s to step forward, describing the problems secrecy cre-
ated. Many birth parents explained that they accepted
secrecy because they were told they had no other choice.
Adoptees spoke of feeling punished for circumstances
around their births over which they had no control and for
being denied access to information about themselves that
is everyone else’s birthright. Wrenching tales of frustration
and pain in search and reunion continue in the electronic
and print media today (Pertman, 2000).
As social workers, legislators, and agency policymakers
listened to adoptees’ and birth parents’ stories of pain and
struggle in closed adoption, they began to realize that prac-
tices once thought to be humane and protective were actu-
ally experienced as insensitive, coercive, intrusive, and
paternalistic (Siegel, 1993). Slowly, starting in the mid-
1980s (Grotevant & McRoy, 1998), some agencies began to
experiment with empowering prospective birth parents
and adoptive parents to make their own decisions about
how much they wanted to know about each other and how
much contact to have before and after the adoption final-
ization. Today, some form of contact along the openness
continuum characterizes most agencies’ practice in adop-
tion (Fravel, McRoy & Grotevant, 2000; Grotevant &
McRoy, 1998; Rappaport, 1992; Shireman, 2003). Although
some traditional, confidential adoptions still occur, they
are no longer the norm.
There are both practical and ethical reasons for this
change. Some believe that as fewer healthy white babies
became available for adoption in the United States—the
result of readily available birth control and relaxing atti-
tudes about single parenthood—birth parents gained
more power and voice in the highly competitive adoption
marketplace; thus, they were better able to assert their wish
to participate in choosing the adoptive family for their
child and have some form of postplacement contact
(Pertman, 2000). It is interesting, however, that the over-
whelming majority of the adoption literature that
describes the open adoption movement focuses not on
market forces but on the emotional and social well-being
of the birth parent, adoptee, and adoptive parent
(Brodzinsky, Smith, & Brodzinsky, 1998; Grotevant &
McRoy, 1998). Thus, the debate over whether open adop-
tion is a long overdue change or a nightmare in disguise is
essentially about what is best for human well-being. In
other words, whether an adoption is open or closed, and
how open it is, reflects values; it is an ethical issue.
Proponents of secrecy, confidentiality, and permanently
sealed adoption records argue that open adoption harms
the birth parent, adoptee, and adoptive parent (Kraft,
Palombo, Woods, Mitchell, & Schmidt, 1985a, 1985b,
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1 In some states, for example, law requires that original birth certificates be sealed
forever. But there is no proscription against birth and adoptive family members
voluntarily sharing identifying information and having contact with each other.
Law in some states requires a lie; when a child is adopted, a new birth certificate
is issued, declaring that the child was born to the adoptive parents.
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1985c). They claim that openness impairs the adoptee’s
identity formation, interferes with the adoptive family’s
ability to bond with one another, diminishes the adoptive
parents’ sense of entitlement to the child, and hinders the
birth parents’ grief work. Open adoption advocates, on the
other hand, cite research and clinical experience that open-
ness comforts the birth parent by providing access to
information about the child’s well-being, gives the child
access to important medical information (such as infor-
mation not known to the birth family at the time of the
birth, but highly relevant to the adoptee later in life) and
answers to the child’s questions about why their birth par-
ents made an adoption plan, invites the child to ask ques-
tions and express concerns to their adoptive parents, and
empowers adoptive parents with background information
needed to parent this particular child. A growing body of
research literature indicates that the dire consequences
predicted in the early days of open adoption have not come
to fruition; on the contrary, participants in open adoption
report feeling satisfied with the kinds of contact they have
(Brodzinsky et al., 1998; Gross, 1993, 1997; Grotevant,
2000; Grotevant & McRoy, 1998; Martin, 1998; Melina &
Roszia, 1993; Shireman, 2003; Siegel, 1993, 2003, 2006).
Key Ethical Issues
Discussion of the range and types of ethical issues in open
adoption can be organized along three dimensions. One is
the lifecycle phase of an adoption, that is, pre- versus post-
placement. The second dimension for examining ethical
issues in open adoption is the participant’s perspective, that
is, from the point of view of the agency policymaker, social
worker (or other direct service provider), birth parent,
adoptive parent, child, and others with an interest in the
adoption (e.g., lawyer, hospital administrator, nurse). The
third dimension is the type of adoption, that is, whether the
adoption was of an infant or older child, a child born in the
United States or abroad, through the public child welfare
system or private agency, transculturally or transracially, or
with or without identified special needs. In each of these
dimensions ethical issues arise related to privacy, confiden-
tiality, self-determination, paternalism, conflicts of inter-
est, deception, and truth telling.
Ethical Issues: Preplacement
Many ethical issues confront agencies during the preplace-
ment phase of an adoption. Agency personnel must make
decisions about what kinds of pre-and postplacement con-
tact they wish to offer, encourage, require, or accept. For
example, they must decide how much autonomy and voice
they are willing to give birth parents in choosing an adop-
tive family. Some agencies give birth parents virtually
unlimited access to notebooks or computer files full of
“Dear Birth Mother” letters that prospective adoptive 
parents have composed in the hopes that a pregnant
woman or couple will choose them as the child’s family.
Other agencies give a birth parent one prospective adop-
tive family’s profile at a time; if the birth parent declines
that match, then the agency offers up another. Still other
agencies give a birth parent three profiles at a time. Birth
parents involved involuntarily in the public child welfare
system often have no voice in choosing the adoptive fam-
ily. Some agencies offer, others require, and some forbid a
birth parent the right to have telephone contact with or
meet a prospective adoptive family face to face before mak-
ing a decision to place with them. Some agencies only
allow a face-to-face meeting after the birth parent has cho-
sen the family. Where agencies fall on these continua of
choices reflects implicit ethical assumptions about birth
parents’ autonomy and rights to make informed choices
for themselves and share power and control in the pread-
option process.
Agencies have different stances with regard to empower-
ing prospective adoptive parents in the preplacement pro-
cess as well. If a prospective adoptive parent declines to
accept a child from a particular birth family (perhaps
because of discomfort with the birth family’s race, mental
health status, prenatal care, substance use), some agencies
move that prospective adoptive parent to the bottom of the
waiting list for a new referral. Other agencies respect par-
ents’ self-assessment of acceptable risk and do not penalize
them for saying no to a referral. Agencies also differ in how
much and what kinds of preadoption education they offer
or require concerning the unique issues and challenges
involved in adopting transracially, transculturally, and
children with special physical or mental health needs.
Issues of paternalism and self-determination permeate
other agency decisions as well. For example, agencies have
different perspectives on what they will and will not accept
in the home-study process. While ultimately every agency
that does home studies must screen out unsafe adoptive
placements, some agencies see the home study primarily as
an opportunity for adoptive parents to acquire preadop-
tion education and self-examination and are unlikely to
screen out any but the most unsafe situations (e.g., a par-
ent with a history of pedophilia); other agencies see the
home study primarily as a tool to screen out unfit, unap-
pealing homes, from the agency’s point of view.
Furthermore, agencies differ in what kinds of minimum
postplacement contact they require. Some agencies allow
parents to decide for themselves what makes sense; others
have a more paternalistic one-size-fits-all approach (e.g.,
they require the adoptive family to send a full-frontal facial
photograph of the child to the agency once a year and/or
refuse to honor adoptive and birth parents’ requests for
each other’s home addresses so they can communicate
without an intermediary).
Decisions reflecting paternalism rather than a focus on
self-determination also appear in agencies that will not
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allow prospective adoptive parents to bring an infant home
before the birth parent’s parental rights have been legally
terminated. Some agencies require that all such “legal risk”
children remain in foster care until they are legally free for
adoption. This means that in states in which birth parents
have weeks or months in which to rescind their consent to
terminate parental rights, the child must experience a
change of placement from foster to adoptive home, and the
adoptive parent(s) must wait to bring home the child they
are willing to accept. This form of paternalism is designed
to protect so-called overeager or desperate adoptive parents
from the pain of losing the child. It may also be intended to
protect the agency and social workers from having to deal
with the intense emotional responses of prospective adop-
tive parents who grieve the loss of a child reclaimed by the
birth parent before the adoption is finalized.2
In the public child welfare system, unique ethical issues
emerge in the preplacement phase. In some states, birth
parents who face having their parental rights involuntarily
terminated, as a result of abuse or neglect, are told that if
they “voluntarily” terminate their rights they are entitled to
an open adoption. They are similarly told that if they exer-
cise their legal right to fight the involuntary termination,
they will ultimately lose not only their parental rights but
also the option of having any kind of ongoing contact with
the child in the adoption. This legal practice is, from a pro-
fessional social work point of view, unethical and an
unsound basis for forging the extended adoptive family; if
postadoption contact between a particular birth parent
and child is in that child’s best interests, the contact should
occur whether that birth parent’s rights are terminated vol-
untarily or involuntarily.
When public agencies thus use open adoption as an
incentive to entice a birth parent to terminate parental
rights, a child who does not want contact with the birth
parent, or adoptive parents who feel uncomfortable with
contact, may find themselves in an open-adoption
arrangement that does not work for them. The birth par-
ent, child, and adoptive parents may feel coerced into
accepting an open-adoption arrangement, fearing that fail-
ure to agree to the plan will jeopardize the adoption or
harm them. For example, the birth parent may fear loss of
all contact forever. The adoptive parents may fear that if
the state must pursue a petition for an involuntary termi-
nation of parental rights, the court might return the child
to the birth parent, or they will have to endure 18 months
or more of legal uncertainty as the involuntary termina-
tion of parental rights (TPR) process unfolds.
Often, foster parents become willing to adopt the foster
child in their care. But sometimes foster parents and the
birth parents of the children in their care have no access to
one another or contact with each other throughout the
placement. When the birth parent’s arm is twisted into
accepting a “voluntary” TPR, the two parties are brought
together, perhaps for the first time, in court immediately
before the TPR hearing for mediation to negotiate an
agreement for postplacement contact. Unfortunately, a
lifelong agreement is not best negotiated between parties
who have no experience with one another—no history
that would be the basis on which to develop trust and col-
laboration. Thus, these open adoption agreements may be
forged under mutual duress. Both parties feel disempow-
ered, pressured to reach an agreement hurriedly on the spot
so the adoption can go through. There is no time to feel
each other out, process one’s own feelings and needs, and
assess how well everyone can communicate and problem-
solve together. This situation meets the needs of hurried,
harried court and social service workers, but it may not
meet the needs of the people who must live with the open
adoption and honor the agreement for years to come.
International adoption involves unique ethical issues
regarding openness. Some prospective adoptive parents
prefer international adoption as a way to avoid dealing
with birth parents (Alexander, 2004; Siegel, 1998). They
feel less threatened by a birth parent who lives on another
continent. Many adoption professionals view this as a
problem, given what is known about adoptees’ need for,
and right to, information about themselves and access to
their birth families (Melina, 1993; Siegel, 1998). Agencies,
funded by fees charged to adoptive parents, may experi-
ence conflicts of interest in the form of financial incentives
to overlook prospective parents’ discomforts about open-
ness, even though those discomforts can impair the par-
ents’ ability to empathize with the adoptee.
Ethical issues around truth telling and deception
abound in open adoptions of all types. Birth parents may
withhold information about themselves that they fear will
lead adoptive parents to decline the adoption or close the
door on openness. Adoptive parents may withhold infor-
mation from, or deliberately deceive, birth parents out of
fear that the birth parent will not place the child with
them. Prospective adoptive parents might tell birth parents
they are willing to have postplacement contact, when in
fact they do not plan to honor that promise. Deception,
either by withholding information or providing false
information, clouds complete openness and compromises
the relationships and trust among the people involved in
the adoption. At times, professionals advise or allow one
party or another to withhold potentially important infor-
mation. For example, in one case, the agency social worker
accepted the birth mother’s request not to tell her newborn
infant’s adoptive family that the baby had three biological
siblings adopted by another family; this birth mother
FAMILIES IN SOCIETY | Volume 88, No. 1
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2 From an ethical standpoint, it is intriguing that while “legal risk” placement is
often not available via private agencies, it may be unavoidable in the public
child welfare system; the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA, Public
Law 105–89) mandates “concurrent planning”—that is, when a child enters
foster care, the public child welfare agency must simultaneously seek to
reunify the child with the biological parents and begin adoption planning,
preferably with the foster parent, if possible.
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feared that her mother, who participated in an open adop-
tion with the first three siblings’ adoptive family, would
find out about the fourth child that the birth mother had
conceived, delivered, and placed for adoption. This
nondisclosure respected the birth mother’s right to privacy
but ignored the four siblings’ right to know and have con-
tact with each other.
Postplacement Issues
There are many different beliefs about what kinds of post-
placement contact make sense. Different social workers
give remarkably different advice. Some give little advice,
preferring instead to promote self-determination, help
birth and adoptive parents learn what the open adoption
options are, and decide which make sense to them in their
unique situation. Others give varying amounts and types
of direction. Some social workers are more paternalistic
and believe that they know best, based on their experience
in the field. Others believe that their role is to educate,
empower, and facilitate. Hence, ethical decisions about
paternalism versus self-determination shape social work
practice and policy in this regard as well (Reamer, 1983).
Adoptive parents face many ethical choices and deci-
sions during the life of an open adoption. When the open-
ness agreement is part of the adoption decree, as in some
adoptions finalized by public child welfare agencies, a child
may resist having contact with a birth parent who was abu-
sive or neglectful; then the adoptive parents are faced with
the difficult ethical choice of whether to honor the agree-
ment or respond to the child’s changing needs. When a
birth parent with whom they have an open adoption agree-
ment does not uphold his or her end of the plan (e.g., does
not show up for an agreed-upon visit, thus distressing the
child), adoptive parents might reconsider their initial agree-
ment. This is also true when a birth parent behaves during
visits in ways that disturb the child, such as showing up ine-
briated or saying hurtful things (e.g., one birth mother told
the child, “Don’t worry. When you’re 13, you can come live
with me again.”). When a birth parent falls out of touch,
leaving no forwarding address, adoptive parents must
decide whether to respect the birth parent’s distance or pur-
sue that person, thus honoring the child’s need to know
where the birth parent is. This can be a challenging ethical
decision, since often there is no way for the adoptive par-
ents to know if the birth parent has fallen out of touch
unintentionally or out of a wish for privacy and distance.
Postplacement openness also involves parental decisions
about truth telling and full disclosure, that is, how much
information to share with the child about the birth par-
ents. Adoptive parents must decide, for example, whether
and how to tell a child that he was conceived by gang rape,
or she was exposed in utero to polysubstance abuse, or that
the birth parents have other children they are parenting.
Similarly, they must decide how transparent to be with the
birth parent regarding important developments in the
adoptive family (e.g., parental divorce, alcoholism, child-
behavior problems). In short, openness involves all kinds
of ethical choices about truth telling, deceiving, and with-
holding information paternalistically. Adoptive parents
must make ethical decisions about how open to be with
whom, when, and about what. Research has shown that
even adoptive parents who say they believe in openness,
honesty, and truth sometimes keep information from the
children they have adopted and from the child’s birth
parents (Siegel, 2006).
During the life of an open adoption, social workers, adop-
tive parents, administrators, and others face ethical deci-
sions about how assertive to be in helping the parties in an
adoption achieve and maintain contact with one another.
Some agencies, for example, will automatically forward any
letter sent to them. Others keep letters in a file, waiting for
the intended recipient to contact the agency to ask if any let-
ters have arrived. Every person touched by an adoption—be
it a child, adult adoptee, parent, or professional—also faces
ethical choices about whether, when, and how to nudge any
adoption into further openness over time. These decisions
involve compelling ethical issues of privacy, confidentiality,
promise keeping, conflicts of interest, self-determination,
paternalism, deception, and truth telling.
Ethical Guidelines in Open Adoption: 
Best Practices
In light of these prevailing trends and challenges in open
adoption, social workers must develop ethically sound
“best practices” that can inform decision making in com-
plex situations. These guidelines should be based on cur-
rent, practical, state-of-the-art ethical theories, concepts,
and standards available in the practical ethics field.
Practical ethics entails the deliberate application of ethical
theories and concepts to challenges faced by practitioners
(Reamer, 2006a, 2006b; Singer 1993).
The most prominent concepts and theories in the prac-
tical ethics field are the deontological perspective, the teleo-
logical perspective, and the virtue ethics perspective. A brief
overview is necessary as a prelude to identifying how each
perspective can enhance social workers’ ethical approach
to open adoption.
Deontological theories (from the Greek deontos, “of the
obligatory”) are those that claim that certain actions are
inherently right or wrong, or good or bad, without regard
for their consequences (Frankena, 1988; Rachels, 2002).
From a deontological perspective, rules, rights, duties,
laws, and principles pertaining to open adoption are sacred
and inviolable; the ends (making an open adoption plan)
do not justify unethical means (using deception or mis-
representation to facilitate the adoption). For example, a
deontologist might argue that it is inherently unethical for
prospective adoptive parents to mislead birth parents
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about their plans to participate in an open adoption. Also,
from a deontological view, it would be unethical for adop-
tive parents to break their promise to birth parents about
visiting or exchanging letters after finalization. Similarly,
from a deontological perspective, it would be inherently
unethical for birth parents to mislead prospective adoptive
parents about themselves (e.g., the stability of their mar-
riage or their past drug use) or agree to an open adoption
plan with which they do not intend to comply.
Teleological theories
(from the Greek teleios,
“brought to its end or pur-
pose”) approach ethical
challenges in a fundamen-
tally different way. Accord-
ing to this perspective, the
rightness of any action is
determined by the good-
ness of its consequences.
Pure teleologists think it is
naïve to make ethical deci-
sions and choices without
weighing the potential
consequences; to do other-
wise is to engage in what the philosopher Smart refers to as
“rule worship” (Smart & Williams, 1973). From this per-
spective (also known as consequentialism), any degree of
deception in open adoptions must be weighed against pos-
sible benefits. Taken to an indefensible extreme, for exam-
ple, a strict teleologist might argue that it is acceptable for
prospective adoptive parents to lie to a birth parent about
their intentions regarding open adoption (as in, “Of
course, we plan to stay in touch with you and arrange
annual visits between you and the child.”), if such decep-
tion is necessary to convince the birth parents to consent
to the adoption.
Perhaps the best-known school of teleological thought is
utilitarianism, which holds that one should handle an ethi-
cal challenge in a way that promotes the maximum good
for the greatest number of people, including adoptees, birth
parents, and adoptive parents. According to the classical
form of utilitarianism, when faced with an ethical dilemma,
one should do that which is likely to produce the greatest
good, based on a thorough review of all possible benefits
and risks. Thus, decisions about participating in an open
adoption, how much contact to have, and what form the
contact will take should be based on a thorough benefit-
cost analysis or calculus that takes into account the emo-
tional, legal, and other consequences for the participants.
The third major perspective in practical ethics, virtue ethics,
focuses much more on what actions are consistent with that
of a “good person.” That is, in the face of an ethical dilemma,
one should strive to do that which a morally good or virtuous
person would do. Professionals’ own moral virtues and char-
acter are at the heart of ethical decisions (MacIntyre, 1984);
ethical standards contained in codes of ethics and other
guidelines supplement these core virtues. According to
Beauchamp and Childress (2001), “a virtue is a trait of char-
acter that is socially desirable, and a moral virtue is a morally
valuable trait of character.…We care morally about people’s
motives, and we care especially about their characteristic
motives, that is, the motives deeply embedded in their char-
acter. Persons who are motivated in this manner by sympathy
and personal affection, for example, meet our approval,
whereas others who act the
same way, but from motives
of personal ambition,
might not” (p. 27).
From this virtue ethics
perspective, an ethical
social worker involved in
open adoption has virtu-
ous values and character
traits—for example, as
articulated in the Code of
Ethics of the National
Association of Social
Workers (National Associ-
ation of Social Workers
[NASW], 1999)—and acts in a manner consistent with
them. In their classic discussion of this perspective, ethi-
cists Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (2001) identify
several core or “focal” virtues that are critically important
in the work carried out by professionals: compassion, dis-
cernment, trustworthiness, integrity, and conscientious-
ness. Compassion is a trait that combines an attitude of
active regard for another’s welfare (e.g., an infertile
prospective adoptive parent, an adopted child, or a birth
parent) with an emotional response of deep sympathy, ten-
derness, and discomfort at another’s misfortune or suffer-
ing. Compassion presupposes sympathy, has affinities with
mercy, and is expressed in acts of beneficence that attempt
to alleviate the misfortune or suffering of another person.
Discernment brings sensitive insight, acute judgment, and
understanding to professionals’ actions (e.g., when social
workers mediate agreements among open adoption partic-
ipants about postfinalization contact or respond to an
adoptive parent’s decision to ignore a birth parent because
such contact is a reminder of the adoptive parent’s inabil-
ity to produce a child by birth). Discernment involves the
ability to make judgments and reach decisions without
being unduly influenced by extraneous considerations,
fears, and personal attachments (e.g., an adoptive parent’s
ignoring a birth parent because contact is a painful
reminder of one’s own infertility to produce a child by
birth). Trustworthiness (e.g., between birth parents and
adoptive parents with regard to the frequency and form of
contact and information sharing) entails a confident belief
in and reliance on the moral character and competence of
another person. Trust requires confidence that another will
FAMILIES IN SOCIETY | Volume 88, No. 1
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Postplacement openness also involves
parental decisions about truth telling and
full disclosure, that is, how much
information to share with the child about
the birth parents.
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act with the right motives and in accordance with appro-
priate moral norms. Integrity (of all of the open-adoption
participants) means soundness, reliability, wholeness, and
integration of moral character. Finally, conscientiousness
involves action that is motivated by an individual’s sense of
what is right because it is right, and where one has tried
with due diligence to determine what is right, intends to do
what is right, and exerts an appropriate level of effort to do
so. Together, these five focal virtues provide a conceptual
foundation for guidelines that can help open-adoption
participants create and honor agreements, which are dis-
cussed in the following sections.
Beauchamp and Childress (2001) directly link these five
focal virtues to four core moral principles that constitute
the moral foundation of professional practice: autonomy,
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. These moral
principles clearly have broad application to, and implica-
tions for, social workers’ approach to open adoption.
Autonomy—which is closely connected to the enduring
social work value of client self-determination as conveyed
in the NASW Code of Ethics (NASW, 1999, standard 1.02;
also see Reamer, 2002, 2006a)—implies self-rule that is free
from both controlling interference by others and from lim-
itations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent
meaningful choice. The autonomous individual (e.g., a
birth mother who wishes to maintain contact with her
child) acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan
based on full information about all available options. A per-
son of diminished autonomy (e.g., a birth parent struggling
with poverty, mental health challenges, or lack of commu-
nity-based support and affordable housing) is in some
respect controlled by others or has difficulty acting on the
basis of her desires and plans. Nonmaleficence entails an
obligation not to inflict harm on others. These are typical
examples: Do not cause pain or suffering; do not inflict
emotional harm; do not cause offense; and do not deprive
others of the goods of life. Thus, social workers should not
harm participants in open adoptions by lying to them,
withholding information from them, or misleading them
(consistent with the NASW Code of Ethics standard focused
on trustworthiness [4.04]). Beneficence connotes acts of
mercy, kindness, and charity. Forms of beneficence also
typically include altruism, love, and humanity. Beneficence
in open adoptions refers to an action done to benefit par-
ticipants as much as possible (consistent with the NASW
Code of Ethics standard focused on commitment to clients
[1.01]). Finally, justice implies efforts to promote fairness.
Injustice involves a wrongful act or omission that denies
people benefits to which they have a right or distributes
burdens unfairly. Social workers are especially concerned
about promoting justice among people who are vulnerable
(e.g., the child of a pregnant woman who seeks to make an
adoption plan or of a parent involved in the public child
welfare system because of abuse and neglect), oppressed
(victims of racial, ethnic, or social discrimination), or living
in poverty (consistent with the NASW Code of Ethics
standard focused on social justice [6.01]).
Implications for Practice: Ethical 
Open Adoption
Based on these mainstream ethical theories and schools of
thought, and guidelines in the NASW Code of Ethics, open
adoption should comprise several key features that pro-
mote the following core values:
Protection of the Most Vulnerable
Decisions and actions should be based on a commitment
to meeting the needs of the most vulnerable, powerless
participants (consistent with the moral principles of
beneficence and nonmaleficence). Social workers’ primary
commitment must be to the child’s best interests, as the
child has the least autonomy and power of all the partici-
pants in the adoption.
Fundamental Respect and Trustworthiness
Openness in adoption is not just about contact and infor-
mation exchange. It is about nonjudgmental respect, trust,
compassion, and good will. Open adoption agreements
should be entered into in good faith (consistent with the
focal virtues of compassion and trustworthiness).
Honesty and Truthfulness
Secrets and deception impair openness. According to the tru-
ism, “where facts flounder, fantasies flourish.”3 Secrets and
deception used to camouflage truth are often more potent than
the facts they are hiding. Open adoption participants should be
forthright with one another and avoid misrepresentation (con-
sistent with the focal virtue of integrity).This includes (1) being
honest with oneself about the kinds of pre- and postadoption
contact one is truly able to honor and being truthful in sharing
these feelings with others involved in the adoption, and (2)
revealing information about oneself that is important for oth-
ers to know to make truly informed decisions.
Autonomy
Social workers should promote the right to self-determina-
tion of everyone concerned (adoptees, birth parents, adop-
tive parents, and adoption professionals) without
exploitation or abuse of any participants (consistent with the
moral principle of autonomy). To enhance participants’
autonomy, social workers should provide assertive, extensive
pre- and postadoption education, focusing especially on
the child’s needs.4 Openness ultimately is for the child
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3 Personal communication, Sharon Kaplan Roszia.
4 The principle of autonomy means that the social worker’s role is to help open-
adoption participants decide for themselves what kinds of pre- and postadop-
tion contact makes sense for them, rather than tell open-adoption participants
what they ought to do. In open adoption, autonomy means one size does not
fit all.
(consistent with the moral principles of beneficence and
nonmaleficence). As the child grows, he or she should have
more opportunity to exercise her or his autonomy and influ-
ence the nature of the open adoption. In honoring the prin-
ciple of autonomy, one should expect to change an open
adoption agreement over time as participants’ needs change.
Changes should be negotiated explicitly and respectfully and
not made unilaterally. Social workers, birth parents, and
adoptive parents should not confuse their own needs with
those of the child’s or other participants. If a child needs con-
tact, the child should not be deprived of it simply because it
is expedient for the others involved (such as public child wel-
fare attorneys, social workers, and parents). Similarly, a child
should not be required to participate in contact the child
does not want.
Open adoption provides social workers with unique
opportunities and challenges to honor the profession’s
most cherished values. In open adoption, social workers
must be vigilant in their efforts to uphold and embrace the
profession’s enduring ethical principles.
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